tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2182962435875556601.post5361854282821143782..comments2023-09-24T08:04:06.909-04:00Comments on FSK's Guide to Reality: Prisoner's Dilemma FnordFSKhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11903396202330950362noreply@blogger.comBlogger1125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2182962435875556601.post-23605022929773367952009-05-24T19:50:52.519-04:002009-05-24T19:50:52.519-04:00Prisoner's Dilemma is not at fault for the subsidy...Prisoner's Dilemma is not at fault for the subsidy situation. The problem is the application of PD. Whoever uses this analogy as you cited it fails to see that this is actually an instance of Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, where players can base their decisions off the other player's past decision. Under IPD, one has to deal with the ecology of other players: If it is expected that the other player will follow a course of action regardless of its consequences (e.g. always cooperate or always defect no matter what the other player has done), then it is rational to always defect. However if there is a reasonable expectation that the other player will cooperate if they see you are willing to cooperate and the other player will defect if you try to take advantage of them, then in IPD, it is a very good strategy to do the same.<br /><br />Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma is, in fact, a very good model if and only if the decision is controlled by those people who are economically affected. Unfortunately, this is not usually the case.Unknownhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14520562798873748682noreply@blogger.com